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EXTRACTING DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION
FROM THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
STUART E. SEIGEL*
STANLEY I. LANGBEIN**
INTRODUCTION
"Publicity," said Justice Brandeis, "is justly commended as a
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman."1 Decades after this remark was made Congress
sought to promote publicity and disclosure by passing legisla-
tion2 attacking the self-protective and self-perpetuating policies
of government agencies.3 Agencies are no longer afforded the
luxury of avoiding scrutiny simply by withholding pertinent in-
formation from private individuals.4 As a governmental agency,
the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) is subject to the publicity
* Partner, Williams & Connolly, Washington, D.C.; B.S., New York University;
LL.B., New York University; LL.M. in Taxation, Georgetown University.
** Attorney, Williams & Connolly, Washington, D.C.; B.S., Yale University; J.D.,
Harvard University. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Sara Sanchez
for her assistance in the preparation of this Article.
L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1980).
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was passed originally in 1966 and amended
in 1974, 1976, and 1978. It is now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). Section 6110 of the
Internal Revenue Code was passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. It is now
codified at I.R.C. § 6110. The Privacy Act was passed in 1974 and is now codified at 5
U.SC. 552a (1976).
1 Consumers Union v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 436 F. 2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). In this case, the district court of Southern New
York made the following observations concerning the Freedom of Information Act:
The purpose of the Act, seen in the statutory language and the legislative
history, was to reverse the self-protective attitude of the agencies under
which they had found that the public interest required, for example, that the
names of unsuccessful contract bidders be kept from the public. The Act
made disclosure the general rule and permitted only information specifically
exempted to be withheld; it required the agency to carry the burden of sus-
taining its decision to withhold information in a de novo equity proceeding in
a district court. Disclosure is thus the guiding star for this court in constru-
ing the Act.
Id. at 799-800.
'Id. See generally Scherer v. Kelley, 584 F. 2d 170 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 964 (1979) (suppression of information to private party is not to be aided); Miller v.
Webster, 483 F. Supp. 883 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (information unjustifiably withheld from
public scrutiny must be released); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 451 F. Supp.
736 (D. Md. 1978) (promotion of broad public access to information is within control of
government).
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and disclosure legislation passed by Congress.' Individual ac-
cess to documents and information held by the I.R.S. has been
greatly facilitated by the passage of three major statutes: the
Freedom of Information Act,6 section 6110 of the Internal
Revenue Code,7 and the Privacy Act.'
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is the statute
through which the broadest range of materials may be gathered
from the Internal Revenue Service.9 FOIA aids the individual in
extracting documents and information from the I.R.S. because
it creates a right on the part of "any person"' 0 to obtain any
"records"11 from government agencies. In addition, FOIA has
5 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1976). For purposes of FOIA and the Privacy Act, the term
"agency" is defined as follows:
(1) "agency" means each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does
not include-
(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United
States;
(D) the government of the District of Columbia;
(E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of represen-
tatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by
them;
(F) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied
territory ....
Id
, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
I.R.C. § 6110.
8 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
"See Taxation with Representation Fund v. I.R.S., 646 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(I.R.S. general counsel memoranda and technical memoranda disclosable under FOIA);
Hawkes v. I.R.S., 507 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1974) (I.R.S. manual and supplement
disclosable under FOIA); Pies v. I.R.S., 484 F. Supp. 930 (D.D.C. 1979) (drafts of
technical memorandum and proposed regulations disclosable under FOIA).
," 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976). Under this provision an individual has a legally en-
forceable right of access to I.R.S. documents even though he is not involved in litiga-
tion with the I.R.S. His right to I.R.S. documents is one of entitlement, not one of
agency courtesy. Id
" Id. Under this provision, agency obligations to disclose records are triggered by an
individual's request meeting two criteria: "(A) reasonably describes such records and
(B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and
procedures to be followed .... " Id
304
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liberal procedural rules 2 to expedite the processing of requests
for information at the administrative level'8 and to provide for
strict judicial review of agency refusals to disclose
information."' In any review proceeding, FOIA shifts the
burden of proof from the individual to the agency so that the
agency must justify its action in withholding information. 15 The
agency can meet its burden only by showing that the informa-
tion sought comes within one of the nine exemptions specified
in FOIA. 6 During the fifteen-year history of FOIA,17 a substan-
12 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1976). Agencies must make initial determinations on re-
quests within 10 days and a requesting party must be notified immediately of his right
to appeal an adverse determination. Id- An administrative appeals officer must make
determinations with respect to any appeal within 20 days and must notify the re-
questing party of his right to seek judicial review in the event of an adverse appellate
determination. Id at § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). A 10-day extension is allowed when unusual cir-
cumstances exist to prevent an agency from meeting its time limit. Id. at § 552(a)(6)(B).
Unusual circumstances exist whenever an agency must make a field examination or
search a voluminous amount of separate records or consult with another agency in
order to comply with the request. Id. at § 552(a)(6)(B)(i)-(iii). In any event, the requesting
party must be notified in writing of the reasons for the extension and "the date on
which a determination is expected to be dispatched." Id at § 552(a)(6)(B).
"3 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1976). "[Ilf the agency fails to comply with the applicable
time limit," then the requesting party will be deemed to have exhausted his ad-
ministrative remedies under FOIA. Upon a showing of exceptional circumstances and
due diligence, however, an agency can request "additional time to complete its review
of the records." Id. The courts will generally exercise discretion to stay a suit in such an
exceptional situation. See Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547
F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (exceptional circumstances found where agency deluged with
many requests and existing resources were inadequate to deal with the volume). But see
Hamlin v. Kelley, 433 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (inadequate staff, insufficient fund-
ing, or great number of requests did not constitute exceptional circumstances).
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). If a request is denied, or if the I.R.S. does not respond to a re-
quest within 10 days or to an appeal within 20 days, a party may bring a civil action to
compel disclosure. Id § 552(a)(6)(A)-(B). In such a civil action, the United States district
courts have "jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to
order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the [requesting
party]." Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
11 Id When the requesting party alleges that the agency refused his request for iden-
tifiable records, then he has made out a case under FOIA. He does not have to over-
come any presumption in favor of the agency's action. The burden shifts to the agency
to justify its refusal of the party's request. Id
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976). This section states that FOIA disclosure does not ap-
ply to matters that are:
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute... provided that such
statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a
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tial body of judicial law has evolved interpreting those exemp-
tions.18 Much of the discussion below focuses on that judicial
law and on the scope of the FOIA exemptions.
Besides FOIA, the I.R.S. is also subject to a disclosure provi-
sion specially applicable to it-section 6110 of the Internal
Revenue Code. 19 Section 6110 governs the disclosure of "writ-
ten determination[s]"20 by the I.R.S., and its disclosure exemp-
tions generally parallel the exemptions to FOIA.2 1 Section 6110,
however, has its own set of procedures and provisions for
judicial review. Moreover, many courts have held that section
6110 preempts FOIA23 and provides the exclusive means for
securing access to the documents covered by section 6110.24
Although the most significant means of gaining access to
I.R.S. records is through either FOIA or section 6110, there is
yet another statute, the Privacy Act,25 which permits an in-
manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records co'mpiled for law enforcement purposes ...;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, con-
cerning wells.
Id
17 See note 2 supra.
" See, e.g., FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Breuhaus v. I.R.S., 609 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1979); Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB; 490 F.2d
427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. I.R.S., 493 F.
Supp. 549 (D.D.C. 1980); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 476 F. Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1979); Pacheco
v. FBI, 470 F. Supp. 1091 (D.P.R. 1979).
1I.R.C. §6110.
'o I.R.C. § 6110(b)(1). This section defines a written determination as a "ruling, deter-
mination letter or technical advice memorandum." Id
" I.R.C. § 6110(c)(1H7). See note 16 supra.
I.R.C. § 6110(f)(lH3).
2 See Grenier v. I.R.S., 449 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1978) (Tax Reform Act of 1976
meant to supplant FOIA with respect to I.R.S. rulings and determinations); Conway v.
I.R.S., 447 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1978) (Tax Reform Act provides exclusive remedy for
disclosure of I.R.S. documents).
UId1
5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
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dividual to secure personal "record[s]" 26 maintained by govern-
ment agencies on his private life. Strictly speaking, the Privacy
Act is not a disclosure statute; rather, it is a provision designed
to prevent the improper use of personal records maintained by a
government agency on various individuals.2 7 The Privacy Act
has its own set of procedures and judicial remediess which are
generally similar to the procedures applicable under FOIA and
which may be used in conjunction with FOIA procedures."
FOIA, section 6110, and the Privacy Act are the major
disclosure tools used by a private individual to extract informa-
tion from the I.R.S. Yet an individual's request for information
can be denied by the I.R.S. if it can show that the requested in-
formation is specifically exempted from disclosure by a
statutory exemption provision. 0 Thus, a careful analysis of the
20 Id. § 552a(a)(4) (1976). This section defines the term "record" as follows:
[AJny item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is
maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, finan-
cial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and
that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identify-
ing particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a
photograph ....
Id.
" 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1976). This section states that a record about an individual
may not be disclosed to a member of the public unless its disclosure is required by
FOIA. Id Prior to the enactment of the Privacy Act, an agency could disclose an in-
dividual's personal information to any requesting member of the public. Now an agency
must be more careful about how it responds to FOIA requests for individually iden-
tifiable records; it must consider the privacy protection problems before disclosure. See
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372-73 (1976) (a balancing of an in-
dividual's right of privacy against the basic purpose of the FOIA).
28 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1)-(5) (1976). These sections provide the procedure by which an in-
dividual may gain access to his records in order to request an amendment of any record
pertaining to him. The agency must acknowledge the individual's amendment request
within 10 days after its receipt. An agency's refusal to amend must be communicated to
the individual so that he can request a review of the refusal Thereafter, an agency has
30 days in which to answer an individual's request for review. If the agency remains
steadfast in its refusal to amend, then the individual has a right to judicial review. Id
An agency's noncompliance with the Privacy Act's procedural rules will result in civil
remedies for the individual. Id § 552a(g)(1-(5). In a case in which the agency acted in a
willful and intentional manner, the prevailing individual is entitled to actual damages,
court costs, and attorney's fees. Id § 552a(g)(4)(A)-(B).
2 See Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980) (materials specifically exempted
from disclosure by FOIA cannot be disclosed under the Privacy Act); Florida Medical
Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 479 F. Supp. 1291 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (information not
falling within the scope of a FOIA exemption may be disclosable under Privacy Act
rules); Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 471 F. Supp. 1023 (D.D.C.
1979) (agency may disclose an individual's information without his consent if disclosure
required under FOIA).
o See notes 16 & 21 & accompanying text supra.
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exemptions of each statute is necessary to determine which
statute would be the best route for securing records from the
I.R.S. For this reason, the major focus of the discussion below is
upon the judicial interpretation and analysis of disclosure ex-
emptions under the three statutes. The legislative history,
scope, and procedural requirements of each statute are also
developed as a background from which to analyze the applica-
tion of the three statutes to problems that arise in extracting in-
formation from the I.R.S.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1946 section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act l was
introduced to create the statutory principle that members of
the public have a "right" to obtain information possessed by
the executive branch of the Government. Although section 3 ad-
vanced a progressive theory of disclosure, it strictly qualified
the public's right to obtain information by permitting agencies
to withhold from disclosure any information requiring secrecy
for the protection of the public interest. 32 The broad disclosure
exemption greatly undermined public access to government
records under section 3. A reevaluation was necessary. In 1965
House and Senate committees held extensive hearings on the
practices of federal agencies in withholding or disclosing infor-
mation under section 3.33 These hearings led to widespread con-
gressional dissatisfaction with the practices of agencies in
withholding information.3 4
The congressional dissatisfaction sparked efforts to establish
a broad policy -favoring the disclosure of information in the
Act of June 11, 1946, Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 1002 (1964)).
32 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964).
" See Hearings on S. 1160 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 366 (1965); Hear-
ings on H.R. 5012 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1965).
11 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973). According to the Mink court, "[slection 3 was
generally recognized as falling far short of its disclosure goals and came to be looked
upon more as a withholding statute than a disclosing statute. The section was plagued
with vague phrases ... [and] provided no remedy for wrongful withholding of informa-
tion." Id.
[Vol. 12:303
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possession of federal agencies.3 5 Adopted in 1966, F01A 36 man-
dates disclosure of all agency "records"37 that are not specifi-
cally excused from disclosure by one of nine designated exemp-
tions. 38 Even when an exemption is applicable, withholding is
discretionary with each agency, and the Act clearly indicates
that it does not in any way broaden the agency's authority to
withhold information.3 9 FOIA also introduced new and ex-
pedited procedures for judicial review of agency decisions to
withhold information.40
Prior to its enactment in 1966, FOIA was subject to inter-
pretative problems growing out of conflicts in the Senate
report 4' issued in 1965 and the House report 4 issued in 1966.
The Senate report took a more liberal approach favoring
" Id. at 80. FOIA is unquestionably broadly conceived. "It seeks to permit access to
official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to
create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly un-
willing official hands." Id
NAct of September 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976)).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(3) (1976).
'Id § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976). See note 16 supra.
"Id. § 552(c) (1976). The preceding section "does not authorize withholding of infor-
mation or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in
this section. This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress." Id.
40 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A-(6). A FOIA action may be commenced in one of three places:
(1) the district court where the requesting party resides, (2) the district court where the
requesting party's principal place of business is located, or (3) the District of Columbia.
Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). FOIA actions take precedence over other cases on a court's docket,
except cases that the district court considers of greater importance. Id § 552(a)(4)(D).
The Government is required to answer a complaint within 30 days, notwithstanding
any other provision of law or court rule. Id § 552(a)(4)(C). In all FOIA suits, the district
courts have de novo jurisdiction over the matter and the right to in camera inspection
of the records in question. Id § 552(a)(4)(B). The district court's prerogative of in
camera inspection is particularly necessary when the requesting party does not have
precise information concerning the nature of the documents held by the agency. In ad-
dition, the courts have developed special procedures to enable individuals to obtain
records that are not precisely within their knowledge. Such special procedures were pro-
mulgated in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977
(1974). In this case the court ordered the government to provide the plaintiff (1) an
itemized list of records being withheld, (2) a detailed explanation of the reason for
withholding each record, and (3) an index correlating the justification for withholding
the documents or portions of documents being withheld. Id. at 826-28.
4' S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965).
42 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966).
19821
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disclosure than did the House report. 43 In 1966 the Attorney
General issued an interpretative memorandum44 to all federal
agencies concerning the application of FOIA. The memoran-
dum generally adopted the more restrictive disclosure positions
of the House report when significant differences existed be-
tween the two reports.45 Judicial decisions, however, have
generally followed the more liberal Senate report,6 since it was
"the only committee report that was before both houses of Con-
gress. "47
Despite its interpretative problems, FOIA provided access to
government records well beyond that afforded by the
predecessor section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
FOIA provisions give private individuals substantially greater
leverage in dealing with government agencies.8 Currently, an
individual has a right of action in a United States district court
if an agency refuses his request for identifiable records not ex-
empted under other FOIA provisions. 49 Nevertheless, as
originally enacted, FOIA was subject to certain procedural
See notes 41 & 42 supra. See also Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Quoting Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the Vaughn court deter-
mined that "It]he policy of the Act requires that the disclosure requirement be con-
strued broadly, the exemptions narrowly." Id. at 1142. Vaughn also held that the
Senate report more nearly reflected the intent of Congress because it adopted a strong
position favoring disclosure under FOIA. Id& See also Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699
(5th Cir. 1973) (visual aids for training OSHA inspectors not administrative in nature,
subject to disclosure); Hawkes v. I.R.S., 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972) (language of
Senate report favored over language of House report); Stern v. Richardson, 367 F.
Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973) (FBI counterintelligence documents did not fall within FOIA
exemptions).
"Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (1967) [hereinafter cited as Attorney General's Memoran-
dum].
45 I&
" See note 43 supra.
4' Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 425 U.S. 352, 366 (1976), (quoting with ap-
proval Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). See also Vaughn v. Rosen,
523 F.2d 1136, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Senate report was the only report before both
houses because the House membership unanimously passed the Senate bill instead of
attacking and amending it in a conference committee. "By unanimously passing the
Senate Bill without amendment, the House denied both the Senate Committee and the
entire Senate an opportunity to object (or concur) to the interpretation written into the
House Report (or voiced in floor colloquy)." Id. at 1142-43. As a result, most judicial
decisions reflect the view that the Senate report is a more accurate indication of the in-
tent of Congress in interpreting FOIA. See note 43 supra.
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). See note 40 supra.
49 Id.
310 [Vol. 12:303
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problems5 ° and certain difficulties arising out of its exemption
provisions.51 These conditions led Congress to adopt amend-
ments in 1974"2 that substantially modified the procedures
mandated by FOIA53 and made important changes in the scope
of certain FOIA exemptions. 54 The amendment provisions man-
dated a ten-day time limit for the administrative processing of
FOJA requests by an agency55 and a twenty-day time limit for
an agency's response to an appeal lodged by an individual.56 The
1974 amendments also narrowed two57 of the nine express ex-
So Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54 (1967). Under this original
version of FOIA, an agency could stall a FOIA court claim by being unreasonably
dilatory in its response to FOIA requests. Since a FOIA action could not be brought
before the refusal of a request, an agency could play a tactical waiting game in hopes
that most individuals would abandon their requests. Id.
" 5 U,S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1967). Under this 1967 codification of FOIA, the (b)(1) exemp-
tion relating to foreign policy and national defense information was given a broad scope
by the courts so that any agency could avoid its disclosure obligations by invoking the
exemption. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). In this case, the Court held that exemp-
tion (b)(1) did not authorize or permit a federal district court's in camera inspection of a
document "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy." Id. at 81. Denied in camera inspection, the
district courts could not take the initiative to separate the exempt material from the
nonexempt material. Id. Moreover, they were not permitted to review the soundness of
the security classification. Thus, an improperly classified document could be exempted
from disclosure when ordinarily it would be subject to disclosure. Id.
"' Act of November 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-1564 (1974).
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)-(ii) (1976). These 1974 amendments corrected the dilatory
actions of agencies by providing the 10 day limit during which agencies must deal with
FOIA requests. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). Upon appeal of the agency's decision by an in-
dividual, an agency has 20 days in which to decide the appeal. Failure to comply with
those time limits will enable an individual to bring a FOIA court action. Id.
§ 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). See note 12 supra.
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1), (5) (1976). Amended exemption (b)(1) now provides for judicial
review of the propriety of a document's classification under an Executive order. Id. at
§ 552(b)(1)(B).
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1976). The 1974 amendments corrected the dilatory ac-
tions of agencies by providing a limited and specified period for agencies to consider
FOIA requests. See notes 12 & 53 & accompanying text supra.
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) (1976).
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1), (5) (1976). For a discussion of exemption (b)(1) see notes 50 &
54 supra. In EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1973), in camera inspection was denied
for major documents given to the President by high-level government officials. Such
denial was based on exemption (b)(5) of the codified 1967 FOIA; exemption (b)(5) applies
to internal agency memoranda. The Court conceded that exemption (b)(5) could permit
in camera inspection of low-level factual reports, but reports containing a blend of "fac-
tual presentations and policy recommendations" could not be subject to such inspec-
tion. Id. In addition, the Court allowed the agency the opportunity on remand "to
demonstrate the propriety of withholding any documents, or portions thereof, by
means short of submitting them for in camera inspection." Id. at 93-94. The 1974
amendments narrow exemption (b)(5) and provide for in camera inspection by the
courts so that they can separate the factual nonexempt portions from the sensitive ex-
empt portions.
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emptions to FOIA. The amendments specifically overruled En-
vironmental Protection Agency v. Mink,58 in which the Supreme
Court had held that a court could not review the substantive
propriety of an agency's classification of documents. 9 Since an
agency's classification of information could not be reviewed, the
agency could escape mandatory disclosure of nonsensitive in-
formation by combining it with highly sensitive information.0
To end this practice, the 1974 amendments authorized the
judicial review of the propriety of document classifications by
agencies.
Viewed in retrospect, the 1974 amendments appear to have
been, in part, a measured congressional response to the
Watergate abuses of executive privilege and secrecy.6 2 After
Watergate, Congress espoused "open government" 6 policies
that gained considerable support throughout the 1970's. FOIA,
providing individual access to government records, and the
Federal Sunshine Law,6 4 providing public access to governmen-
tal meetings, became tools for inplementing these principles .6
Recognizing the need for open government, Congress passed a
1976 FOIA amendment,6 6 thus narrowing the scope of a FOIA
exemption that allowed the withholding of any information ex-
empted by a collateral statute.6 7 The amended provision
" 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See notes 51 & 57 supra.
" Id. See notes 51 & 57 supra.
60 Id. See notes 51 & 57 supra.
61 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)-(ii) (1976). Under the 1974 amendments, the district courts
are permitted to examine records in camera to determine whether they can be withheld
under any of the nine FOIA exemptions. In fact, the matter to be determined is
whether the requested records come within any of the nine exemptions. Id.
6 Because of the 1974 amendments, the FOIA court can now determine de novo
whether an invocation of executive privilege is justified. See generally United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
" Act of September 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at
5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976)). This statute became known as the Federal Sunshine Law. Sec-
tion 2 of the law provided that "[ilt is hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States that the public is entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding the
decision-making processes of the Federal Government." Id.
6 Id. A primary concern of the Federal Sunshine Law movement was "to provide the
public with such information while protecting the rights of individuals and the ability
of the Government to carry out its responsibilities." Id.
65 Id.
-Id § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247.
67 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). Exemption (b)(3) was narrowed by the 1976 amendment.
The principal objective of this amendment was to overrule the decision of the Supreme
Court in Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975), in which the Court had
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disallows exemption of information under a collateral statute
unless the information is specifically identified by that
statute.6 8
The narrowing of FOIA exemptions grants members of the
public greater access to information held by government agen-
cies. Nevertheless, the broad language of FOIA does not
guarantee the disclosure of all information requested by a
private citizen.6 9 Accordingly, a careful analysis of the scope
and basic structure of FOIA is essential for the strategic deter-
mination of whether to seek information under a FOIA action. °
B. SCOPE AND STRUCTURE
Structurally, FOIA has three basic sets of provisions: (1) the
provisions defining materials that must be disclosed and the
nature of the disclosure required;71 (2) the provisions defining
what is exempt from disclosure; 72 and (3) the provisions
establishing the administrative and judicial procedures to be
followed under FOIA. 73 The first set has three provisions that
determine the scope of FOIA by describing the types of
materials that must be disclosed. 4 At first glance the scope of
held that the exemption for "statutorily exempt" material applied in the context of a
statute that neither specifically identified the type of information to be withheld nor
gave specific criteria for determining when to withhold information. Id. at 265-66. The
amended exemption created an exception for information required by a collateral
statute to be withheld only if the exempting statute "(A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to
be withheld." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). See note 67 supra.
69 See Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979)
(documents discussing tax liability of third-party taxpayers not disclosable to re-
questing party); Mason v. Callaway, 554 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877
(1977) (I.R.S. investigation documents for potential income tax evasion not disclosable
to requesting party); Grabinski v. I.R.S., 478 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (documents
compiled for law enforcement purposes not disclosable to requesting party); Belisle v.
Commissioner, 462 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (documents concerning tax exempt
status of corporation not disclosable to requesting party); Luzaich v. United States,
435 F. Supp. 31 (D. Minn. 1977) (identity of I.R.S. informant not disclosable to re-
questing party).
"0 Cf. Voelker v. I.R.S., 489 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (FOIA action preferred over
Privacy Act); Grenier v. I.R.S., 449 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1978) (FOIA preempted by
§ 6110).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(3) (1976).
Id. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976).
"Id. § 552(a)(4)-(6) (1976).
Id. § 552(a)(1)-(3) (1976).
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FOIA appears to be all-encompassing because the first two pro-
visions specify in great detail the material that must be dis-
closed," while the third provision operates as a catch-all by pro-
viding for the disclosure of any "record" not specified in the
first two provisions.16 This generic language is, however, deceiv-
ing. Although a tremendous amount of material falls within the
purview of FOIA, the scope of the statute is limited, since the
material is subject to varying degrees of disclosure.
Each of the three provisions defining the scope of FOIA deals
with a specific type of information that is subject to a distinct
type of disclosure. For example, the first provision requires that
the material encompassed by its terms be published in the
Federal Register." This provision has five subcategories that
generally require the disclosure of an agency's inner workings
and its substantive statements of general policy. 78 The second
provision governs material that must be indexed and made
available by an agency for public inspection and copying.7 9
Materials categorized under this provision include final case
opinions, agency policy statements, and agency staff instruc-
tions.80 The second provision narrows the scope of FOIA by re-
" Id. § 552(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
76 Id. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
" Id. § 552(a)(1)(A)-(E) (1976).
71 Id. The five subcategories of the first provision are as follows:
(A) descriptions of [the agency's] central and field organization and the
established places at which, the employees ... from whom, and the methods
whereby, the public may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or
obtain decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are
channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all for-
mal and informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which
forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all
papers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law,
and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability
formulated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Id.
79 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1976).
80 Id. The following three categories of materials must be made available for public in-
spection:
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as
orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted
by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a
member of the public ....
Id. § 552(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1976).
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quiring the publishing agency to delete any identifying details
that would constitute "a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy."81 The third provision deals with material that is
made available only on request. Individual access to I.R.S.
records is greatly facilitated by this provision since it requires
the disclosure of any-agency record that has been properly re-
quested.8 2 In its catch-all capacity, the third provision reaches
all agency records except those that are specifically exempted
from disclosure by the exemption provisions of FOIA. An in-
dividual's access to an I.R.S. record is largely determined by
the interpretations given to the FOIA exemptions. Conse-
quently, the remainder of this FOIA discussion will concentrate
on the applicability of the exemptions to I.R.S. records sought
to be disclosed under FOIA.
C. EXEMPTIONS
Before launching a detailed analysis of particular exemptions,
an overview of the general principles underlying all the exemp-
tions is necessary. Such general principles are derived both
from the direct language of FOIA and from case law. The first
major principle is that the agency has the burden of proof in
showing the applicability of an exemption. 3 As mentioned
earlier, this concept is the cornerstone of the effort to imple-
ment the principles underlying FOIA; the agency, rather than
the individual, must justify its position. 4 Second, if a document
includes both exempt and nonexempt portions, the exempt por-
tions must be segregated from the nonexempt portions so that
the nonexempt portions may be disclosed. 5 Third, there is no
"I 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). As a check on the agency, each deletion must be justified and
explained fully in writing. Id In addition, a document falling within this section "may
be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party ... only if-(i) it
has been indexed ... and made available ... as provided by this paragraph; or (ii) the
party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof." Id. § 552(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (1976).
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
83 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1976). See Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1980)
(government bears burden of showing that undisclosed material falls under an exemp-
tion); Barney v. I.R.S., 618 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1980) (I.R.S. sustained burden by writing
to trial court that it did not have the information requested); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977) (burden is
met by a .showing that disclosure would violate a statute).
'4 See note 15 & accompanying text supra.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). This section provides that "[ainy reasonably segregable
portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion
of the portions which are exempt under this subsection." Id.
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requirement of agency withholding even though an exemption
may be applicable.8 6 Fourth, it is irrelevant that a party seeking
information has a special personal reason for seeking that infor-
mation. FOIA confers rights on the public at large, and the
special circumstances of a particular complainant are not rele-
vant to his right to obtain disclosure of a document."7 Finally,
the courts have consistently held that the FOIA exemptions are
to be narrowly construed. 8
Exemption (1)
Although, as indicated, general judicial principles call for a
narrow construction of exemptions, exemption (1), as originally
enacted, 9 was not conducive to a narrow construction because
the propriety or impropriety of its application to information
was not judicially reviewable.90 This problem of court review
was remedied by the 1974 amendments. 1 Amended exemption
(1) currently applies only to matters that are "(A) specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such
Executive order." 92 The executive order" authorizing non-
86 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), in which
the Court held that a party who submits documents to a federal agency is not allowed
to enjoin that agency's disclosure of the documents by a private right of action under
FOIA. Id. at 285. Such a "reverse FOIA" suit does not fall within the purview of FOIA.
Id.
87 See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), in which the Court stated
that a party's rights under FOIA are neither increased nor decreased because he has a
greater special interest in the requested document than the general public. Id. at 143
n.10.
88 See, e.g., Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1980); Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
DOE, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d
945 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
842 (1979); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1978); Columbia
Packing Co. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 563 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1977); New
England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1976); Vaughn v. Rosen,
523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
88 Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54 (1967). Prior to the 1974
amendments, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1967) exempted from FOIA disclosure matters
"specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of the na-
tional defense or foreign policy." Id. See notes 50-51 & accompanying text supra.
"
0 See notes 50-51 & accompanying text supra.
91 Id.
92 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976).
"3 Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401, at 3678
(Supp. IV 1974).
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disclosure under exemption (1) has three principal categories of
exempted information: top secret, secret, and confidential infor-
mation.94 In assessing the three categories, the applicable stan-
dard of review is very important. 6 Another important question
is whether the term "national defense or foreign policy '"96 im-
poses more substantial restrictions on disclosure than does the
term "national security. 9 7
Exemption (1) should play only a modest role in limiting
access to I.R.S. information because a relatively limited range
of I.R.S. information is classified pursuant to an executive
order. The exemption may, however, play a role in a few signifi-
cant areas. One such area involves communication with foreign
officials concerning tax enforcement or the negotiation of tax
conventions." Another area concerns material pertaining to the
"competent authority process" whereby proceedings are con-
ducted under tax treaties on a government-to-government
basis.9 Unable to participate in these proceedings, the taxpayer
has no right to the resulting "competent authority materials"
that fall within the purview of exemption (1).100 Another major
Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1974), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401,
at 3679 (Supp. IV 1974), creates three principal categories: (1) Top Secret information,
the disclosure of which would be "expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
national security"; (2) Secret information, the disclosure of which would be "expected
to cause grave damage to the national security"; and (3) Confidential information, the
disclosure of which would be "expected to cause damage to the national security." Id
95 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1976). It is evident that exemption (1) does not authorize
or permit a court de novo to determine whether a document would harm the national
defense or interfere with foreign policy. S. REP. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
It does, however, permit a reviewing court to determine the propriety, under the ex-
ecutive order, of the agency's classification of the document. "mhe standard for deter-
mining whether a document is properly classified and protected by exemption one is
whether the proper classification procedures have been followed and if by its sufficient
description the contested document logically falls into the category of the exemption in-
dicated." Raven v. Panama Canal Co., 583 F.2d 169, 171 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 980 (1979).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (1976).
97 See generally Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 992 (1975).
On occasion the I.R.S. has refused to comply with requests for information con-
stituting communications to foreign officials concerning tax enforcement. See TAx
NOTES, May 28, 1979, at 676; TAX NOTES, June 18, 1979, at 784.
"5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). FOIA may be the important tool by which a taxpayer may
determine the manner in which the authorities have treated his case unless such infor-
mation is classified as "competent authority materials," which fall within the scope of
exemption (1). Taxpayers should scrutinize closely the propriety of I.R.S. classification
of competent authority materials.
100 Id.
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area protected by exemption (1) is the area of tax treaty negotia-
tions. Any materials underlying the negotiations may be
specifically classified via exemption (1) and thereby placed
beyond the reach of taxpayers. 10 To combat an exemption (1)
obstacle, the taxpayer must request that the reviewing court
determine the propriety of the agency's executive order
classification. Improperly classified materials are not exempt
from disclosure.10 2
Exemption (2)
Exemption (2) applies to matters "related solely to the inter-
nal personnel rules and practices of an agency." 103 Exemption
(2) was the subject of conflicting congressional interpretation in
reports underlying the original enactment of FOIA. The Senate
report interpreted the exemption narrowly,104 while the House
report interpreted it broadly.10 5 Prior to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 16 there was a split of authority concerning which of the
two interpretations should be followed. 07 In Rose the Court
followed the Senate's narrow interpretation of the exemption' 8
1o, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). The materials underlying the treaties may constitute
the "working law" of the I.R.S. See notes 155-58 & accompanying text infra.
102 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976).
103 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1976). See note 16 supra.
"4 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8 (1965). The Senate report stated that
the exemption applied only to "rules as to personnel's use of parking facilities or regula-
tion of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like." Id.
101 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1966). The House report read the
exemption broadly, stating that "[olperating rules, guidelines, and manuals of pro-
cedure for Government investigators and examiners would be exempt from disclosure,
but this exemption would not cover all 'matters of internal management' such as
employee relations and working conditions and routine administrative procedures
which are withheld under present law." Id. The Attorney General's Memorandum
followed the House report in all respects. Attorney General's Memorandum, supra note
44.
10 425 U.S. 352 (1976). While researching an article about disciplinary systems at
military academies, New York law review editors were denied access to the case sum-
maries of the Air Force Academy's honor court hearings although the academy's prac-
tice was to post these hearings and distribute copies to the faculty and administration.
Id at 354-55. The Air Force Academy refused to release the summaries based on ex-
emptions (2) and (6) of FOIA. Id. at 362-77. Cognizant of the need to protect an in-
dividual's privacy, the Supreme Court held that an in camera investigation should be
conducted in the lower court to effect a workable compromise between an individual's
right to privacy and the public's right to government information. Id at 381.
07 Id. at 362-66. Compare Hawkes v. I.R.S., 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972) (narrow
reading of exemption, following Senate report) with Tietze v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp.
610 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (broad reading of exemption, following the House report).
1 425 U.S. at 366-69.
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but qualified its ruling by noting that "at least where the situa-
tion is not one where disclosure may risk circumvention of
agency regulation, Exemption (2) is not applicable to matters
subject to such a genuine and significant public interest.''109
The Court thus introduced into the application of exemption (2)
a judicial balancing of the agency's interest (secrecy) against
the public's interest (disclosure).110
The principal area of concern under exemption (2) has been
the Internal Revenue Manual. The federal courts have con-
sistently rejected the application of the exemption to the
manual.' In Hawkes v. I.R.S.,"' a taxpayer's conviction for
criminal tax fraud was remanded to compel disclosure of those
portions of the Internal Revenue Manual that qualified as "ad-
ministrative" under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(c)."' Also, the Hawkes
court embraced a narrow construction of exemption (2) by con-
cluding that it related only to the "employee-employer type con-
cerns upon which the Senate Report focused.""
4
Exemption (3)
Exemption (3). deals with matters required to be withheld by
statute."5 As originally enacted in 1966, exemption (3) gave
agency officials wide discretion in determining whether or not
to withhold documents."" Congress became dissatisfied with
109 IdL at 369.
"o Id. at 373.
. See, e.g., Hawkes v. I.R.S., 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); Long v. I.R.S., 349 F.
Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972). See also Neufeld v. I.R.S., 646 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
which held that correspondence control forms accompanying third-party cor-
respondence are not exempt under exemption (2). Id
12 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
",3 Id at 795-96. According to the court, "The intent of the limit on [exemption 2] was
to bar disclosure of information which... would significantly impede the enforcement
process." Id. at 795. As long as the enforcement process is not adversely affected, "in-
formation which merely enables an individual to conform his actions to an agency's
understanding of the law applied by that agency does not impede law enforcement and
is not excluded from compulsory disclosure under [exemption 2]." Id.
1,, Id at 797.
15 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). See note 16 supra.
16 See Robertson v. Administrator, FAA, 422 U.S. 255 (1976), in which the Supreme
Court held that exemption (3) applied to a statute that required the FAA Ad-
ministrator to withhold certain reports upon the objection of an affected private party
if the Administrator found that disclosure would "adversely affect" the party and was
"not required in the public interest." Id. Compare Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639
(3d Cir. 1974) (to fall within exemption 3, the exempting statute must prescribe some
basis upon which the administrative determination to exempt is to be made) with
Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
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the discretionary nature of the exemption and amended it to
read as it does presently.' 7 The current exemption applies to
matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute.., provided that such statute (A) requires that the
matters be withheld from the public ... as to leave no discretion
on this issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for
withholding .... "18
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code" 9 is the principal
specific exemption statute in issue when requests are made for
information from the I.R.S. Section 6103 has rules governing
"returns, ' ' 2 "return information,' 2'1 and "taxpayer return in-
formation.' ' 22 It provides that "[rieturns and return informa-
tion shall be confidential ' ' 23 and prohibits Government officers
from disclosing return information except under the exception
provisions of section 6103.124 In general, these exception provi-
sions govern disclosure of information to other agencies or
other public officials. 1 5 The only pertinent exceptions poten-
tially applicable to disclosure of return information to private
parties are the following: section 6103(c), governing disclosure
1020 (1972) (the identity of a letter writer was not disclosed because the information
provided by him was exempted under a federal statute; the determination of exemption
was within the discretionary power of the Board or Administrator named in the
statute).
I,? 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
118 Id
"' I.R.C. § 6103.
20 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1). Returns include tax and information returns; estimated tax
declarations; and claims for refunds, including supporting schedules, attachments, or
lists that supplement the returns, declarations, or refund claims. Id.
121 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A)-(B). The term "return information" means:
(A) a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income,
payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net
worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax
payments, whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be examined or
subject to other investigation or processing .... and
(B) any part of any written determination or any background file document
relating to such written determination ... but such term does not include
data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly
or indirectly, aparticular taxpayer.
Id.
122 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(3). "i[Tlaxpayer return information' [is] ... information as defined
in paragraph (2) which is filed with, or furnished to, the Secretary by or on behalf of the
taxpayer to whom such return information relates." Id
121 I.R.C. § 6103(a).
2I I.R.C. § 6103(c)-(n).
125 Id.
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to a designee of the taxpayer;'2 6 section 6103(e), governing
disclosure to the taxpayer or to persons having a material in-
terest in the taxpayer;' 7 and section 6103(h)(4), governing
disclosure in proceedings to which the taxpayer is a party. 128
In view of the varied exceptions to disclosure promulgated by
section 6103, a considerable uncertainty exists as to the work-
ing relationship between exemption (3) of FOIA, providing for
statutory nondisclosure, and section 6103, classifying return in-
formation as confidential, of the Internal Revenue Code. 129 The
critical question is whether FOIA applies to return information
that is disclosable to private parties under a section 6103 excep-
'6 I.R.C. § 6103(c). Disclosure must be requested by the taxpayer and the designee
must be identified in writing. The I.R.S. has discretion to withhold information when it
determines that disclosure would "seriously impair Federal Tax administration." Id.
'I I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(A)-(F). In the case of an individual, only the individual is treated
as having a material interest except when a "split gift" is made or a joint return is filed,
and a trustee is treated as having a material interest in a gift tax return to the extent
necessary to determine a § 644 tax imposed on the trust. In the cases of partnerships,
corporations, and trusts, certain persons beneficially interested are treated as having a
material interest. Id. The "seriously impair" standard, applicable when individuals re-
quest information, also applies to this provision. Id. § 6103(e)(7). See note 126 & accom-
panying text supra.
12 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4). This section authorizes disclosure of return information in the
course of a "Federal or State judicial or administrative proceeding pertaining to tax ad-
ministration," in one of four circumstances:
(A) the taxpayer is a party to the proceeding, or the proceeding arose out of,
or in connection with, determining the taxpayer's civil or criminal liability, or
the collection of such civil liability, in respect of any tax imposed under this
title;
(B) if the treatment of an item reflected on such return is directly related to
the resolution of an issue in the proceeding;
(C) if such return or return information directly relates to a transactional rela-
tionship between a person who is a party to the proceeding and the taxpayer
which directly affects the resolution of an issue in the proceeding; or
(D) to the extent required by order of a court pursuant to section 3500 of title
18, United States Code, or rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
such court being authorized in the issuance of such order to give due con-
sideration to congressional policy favoring the confidentiality of returns and
return information ....
Id. § 6103(h)(4)(A)-(D). Disclosure under § 6103(h)(4) is not limited by the "significant
impairment of tax administration" standard applicable under § 6103(c) and (e). The
limitational standard under § 6103(h)(4) is considerably stricter; disclosure is limited on-
ly when the Service determines that disclosure "would identify a confidential informant
or seriously impair a civil or criminal tax investigation." Id. § 6103(h)(4).
"' The confusion is compounded by the virtually contemporaneous enactment of
§ 6103 (Oct. 4, 1976) and the 1976 amendment to exemption (3) (Sept. 13, 1976). See
Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 840 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
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tion. Returns and return information are exempt from
disclosure if none of the section 6103 exceptions are applicable;
section 6103 is a statute that clearly meets the provisions of 5
U.S.C.. § 552(b)(5)(B) by providing "specific criteria" for
disclosure and a specific description of the kind of information
protected from disclosure.1 30 If the section 6103 exceptions are
applicable, however, it is not clear that FOIA is reinstated and
applied to the disclosure of returns and return information
under the exceptions. Arguably, section 6103 still operates to
dislodge FOIA, through exemption (3), so that the excepted
return information may be provided only by means of non-
FOIA procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act.'3 1
In Zale Corp. v. I.R.S., the District of Columbia district court
held that section 6103(a) operated to override FOIA and that
returns and return information subject to one of the section
6103 exceptions could be procured only by means of non-FOIA
procedures. 3 3 No other court has dealt directly with the issue
1So See Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
In this case a taxpayer instituted a FOIA suit for the production and disclosure of
I.R.S. materials compiled in a criminal and civil fraud investigation. The I.R.S. con-
tended that § 6103 satisfied the requirements of exemption (3) and that § 6103 was ap-
plicable to all but five of the requested documents. Id. at 831-35. The court rejected tax-
payer's argument that he should have automatic access to all tax liability information
under § 6103(h)(4) upon the initiation of a judicial or administrative tax proceeding. In-
stead, the court held that § 6103(c) and § 6103(e)(6) were applicable to the information
requested by the taxpayer. Id. at 838. The court concluded accordingly "that the provi-
sions of section 6103 dealing with the disclosure of return information to a taxpayer
with a material interest therein [satisfied) the requirements of Exemption 3." Id. at 840.
"I See Zale Corp. v. I.R.S., 481 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1979). Zale Corporation brought
a FOIA suit to compel disclosure of government documents relating to an ongoing tax
investigation conducted by the I.R.S. Zale's four FOIA requests applied to over half a
million pages of documents and computer cards. After 15 months of processing, the
I.R.S. released 55,000 pages of documents and Zale abandoned most of its requests. It
continued, however, to pursue its request for the I.R.S. Special Agents' Report, a
critical document forming the basis of the I.R.S. investigative effort. The I.R.S. de-
clined to disclose this document under exemptions (3) and (7) of FOIA. Id. at 487.
32 481 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1979). The court began by noting that "courts have an
obligation to construe statutes harmoniously where it is reasonable to do so," an obliga-
tion "particularly compelling when a specific measure is enacted subsequent to a provi-
sion of general application." Id. at 488. In addition, the court held that "[aibsent a clear
indication to the contrary, the specific legislation will not be controlled or modified by
the more general." Id.
33 Id. at 489. With respect to the enactment of § 6103, the court held:
Despite ample indication in the legislative history that Congress was aware of
FOIA while it labored over the tax reform legislation, there is no evidence of
an intention to allow that Act to negate, supersede, or otherwise frustrate the
clear purpose and structure of § 6103. For a court to decide that the gener-
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presented in Zale.134
Another problem area is the section 6103 provision that re-
quires the deletion of identifying details. 13 5 According to FOIA,
the I.R.S. has the burden of deleting identifying materials,1 36
but it cannot charge a fee for deleting the material. 137 A ques-
tion then arises as to whether the magnitude of the burden or
cost of making deletions can in itself be sufficient grounds for
refusing disclosure. In Long v. I.R.S.,13 8 the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the I.R.S. argument that the expense and burden of
deleting identifying details from certain data was sufficient
alized strictures of FOIA take precedence over this subsequently enacted,
particularized disclosure scheme would in effect render the tax reform provi-
sion an exercise in legislative futility. Absent an indication that Congress so
intended, this Court will not imply such a prospective pre-emption by FOIA.
Id (footnote omitted).
'14 See, e.g., Long v. I.R.S., 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917
(1980); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
131 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2). Generally, returns and return information are confidential and
cannot be disclosed. Id § 6103(a). Nevertheless, § 6103(b)(2) excludes from the defini-
tion of return information any "data in a form which cannot be associated with, or
otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer." Id § 6103(b)(2). Thus,
there is a distinction between return information that identifies a taxpayer and return
information that does not identify a taxpayer. Id.
,36 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1976).
131 31 C.F.R. § 1.6(a)(1) (1981). Under this regulation, the I.R.S. is not permitted to
charge fees for costs of making deletions required by law. This prohibition is important
in light of the § 6103 rule requiring that tax return information not include data which
cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, a taxpayer. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2). It is the
I.R.S. policy to bear the cost of making deletions to avoid identifying a taxpayer, and
this policy appears to be mandated by FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A). Under this provi-
sion, agencies are permitted to charge fees in accordance with "a uniform schedule of
fees." Fees chargeable are limited to "standard charges for document search and
duplication." Also, agencies are authorized to furnish documents without charge or at
reduced charges when the agencies determine that "waiver or reduction of the fee is in
the public interest," because the information "can be considered as primarily benefiting
the general public." Id.
131 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). In this case taxpayer
brought an action for the disclosure of certain data tapes and check sheets that would
require deletions at a cost of approximately $160,000. Id The Ninth Circuit noted the
general cost of complying with FOIA and held that "[d]espite the massive expenses
that can be involved in even a single request, Congress has not limited access under this
Act," and that "[whether such expenditures are good policy is not a question for us to
decide," because "Congress has determined that access to government records is an im-
portant objective." Thus, the court concluded that "the costs of editing involved in this
case are [not] so extreme that segregation of revealable material is unreasonable as a
matter of law." Id. at 367.
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justification for refusing to disclose those materials. 139
Another potential area of conflict involves the interplay of the
section 6103 exceptions. If a taxpayer is involved in a judicial or
administrative proceeding and seeks return information about
himself, then the section 6103(c) and (e) exceptions conflict with
the section 6103(h)(4) exception. 140 The basic difference is the
standard for withholding information: section 6103(c)
authorizes disclosure when the Secretary of the Treasury deter-
mines that disclosure would not impair federal tax administra-
tion;141 under section 6103(h)(4) the Secretary must determine
whether disclosure would "identify a confidential informant or
seriously impair a civil or criminal tax investigation."'' 4 In
Chamberlain v. Kurtz,'4 the Fifth Circuit resolved the conflict
by holding that section 6103(h)(4) applies only to disclosure by
federal or state officials in a proceeding and does not permit
disclosure to a taxpayer. The court further held that section
6103(h)(4) operates only to permit officials to use returns or
return information as "evidence.' ' 44 Impliedly, the court held
that section 6103(h)(4) does not create discovery rights for any
party who does not have a right to the materials in the first
place. 145
Exemption (4)
Exemption (4) has not been subject to the same degree of con-
troversy as has exemption (3). Basically, exemption (4) applies
to trade secrets and confidential commercial and financial infor-
mation. 14 In practice, exemption (4) has only limited application
'19 Id. Whether deletions made by the I.R.S. are sufficient to avoid indirect identifica-
tion of the taxpayers is a question of fact to be determined by the court. Id. Although
the I.R.S. argued that § 6103(b)(2) was intended to codify existing I.R.S. practice, the
court rejected this argument and held that § 6103(b)(2) "demonstrates a purpose to per-
mit the disclosure of compilations of useful data in circumstances which do not pose
serious risks of a privacy breach." Id. at 368.
140 I.R.C. § 6103(c), (e), (h)(4).
"I I.R.C. § 6103(c).
142 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4).
14. 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
1" Id at 838.
" Id. The Chamberlain result is questionable. Section 6103(h)(4)(D) applies to the pro-
duction of returns and return information pursuant to discovery in a criminal case and
clearly permits it, pursuant to a judicial order, even in a case involving a defendant
other than a taxpayer. Id When the taxpayer is a party, the rules of § 6103(h)(4)(A), (B)
or (C) will apply. A substantial argument can be made that Congress intended the more
liberal standard on disclosure to apply in civil and criminal cases involving a taxpayer
seeking to discover return information in the possession of the government. Id.
146 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). See note 16 supra.
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to requests for I.R.S. information, since most of the material
that would be subject to the exemption is also taxpayer return
information that has been covered already under exemption
(3). 147 Occasional litigation under exemption (4) has resulted in
decisions holding that the I.R.S. must assert more than a "bare
claim of confidentiality'' 48 to support an application of exemp-
tion (4).149
Exemption (5)
Exemption (5) applies to "inter-agency and intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to
a party other than an agency in litigation.""1 ' The federal courts
have held that "the availability by law" standard is satisfied
unless the documents would be privileged under the discovery
rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 ' In general, there
are three categories of privilege recognized under exemption (5):
the deliberative-process privilege," 2 the attorney work-product
privilege,"3 and the attorney-client privilege."14 In applying the
147 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
1 Tax Reform Research Group v. I.R.S., 74-1 U.S.T.C. 9374 (D.D.C. 1974). In this
case the court held that the I.R.S. was required to disclose certain comments on pro-
posed regulations submitted by a private party, notwithstanding that the I.R.S. had
promised confidentiality with respect to the comments. The court found that the I.R.S.
was asserting a "bare claim of confidentiality" with respect to the comments at issue; it
held that such a "bare claim" did not support application of exemption (4) absent a
showing that the documents in question contained the kind of information to which the
exemption applies. Id.
' Id. The court invalidated the provisions of Procedural Rule § 601.601(b), which,
prior to its amendment in 1973, provided that comments on proposed regulations would
be held confidential if the commenting party so requested. It noted that Procedural
Rule § 601.601(b), as amended, "reflect[ed] an appropriate resolution of the conflict be-
tween the desire of the I.R.S. to maintain confidentiality and the requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act." Id.
"50 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976). The language of this exemption has not been changed
since the adoption of FOIA in 1966.
"I FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975)
(attorney work-product privilege); Common Cause v. I.R.S., 646 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (deliberative-process privilege protects predecisional materials); Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (deliberative-process privilege).
1"2 FED. R. Civ. P. 26. In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), the
Sulreme Court held that there exists a "'generally ... recognized' privilege for 'con-
fidential intra-agency advisory opinions'... [the] disclosure of which 'would be in-
jurious to consultative functions of government."' 421 U.S. at 149. See also Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). In Sears the attorney work-product privilege is defined as
"memoranda prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation which set forth the
attorney's theory of the case and his litigation strategy." 421 U.S. at 154. See also
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (leading case discussing the attorney work-
product immunity).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
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limited deliberative-process privilege, the courts in FOIA suits
have established the criteria to guide decision-making. These
criteria were recently reviewed in Taxation with Representation
Fund, Inc. v. I.R.S.155 This case also explored the application of
exemption (5) in the context of I.R.S. materials. The I.R.S.
materials involved in Taxation with Representation Fund are
General Counsel's Memoranda (GCM's),156 Technical Memo-
randa (TM's), 57 and Action on Decision Memoranda (AOD's).1 58
Generally, all three documents are subject to FOIA disclosure,
but the federal court held that predecisional GCM's, TM's, and
AOD's were exempt from disclosure. 15 This principle of exemp-
tion for predecisional internal memoranda was further ex-
panded in Common Cause v. I.R.S, 16 which held that a rejected
tax plan was not subject to disclosure because it did not con-
stitute a "final decision" in the making of I.R.S. law or policy. 61
Exemption (6)
Exemption (6) protects from disclosure "personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would con-
"5 646 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In this case the court distinguished between "pre-
decisional" and "post-decisional" materials. Id at 677. A second criterion identified by
the court is "the function and significance of the document in the agency's decision-
making process." Id at 678. The court distinguished between documents which are
part of "ongoing... processes" and those that embody or detail the "working law" of
the agency. Id at 677-78.
" Id at 669. General Counsel's Memoranda (GCM's) are prepared by attorneys in
the Interpretive Division of the Office of Chief Counsel. They are legal memoranda
prepared for the I.R.S. in response to an I.R.S. request for legal advice. They usually
concern taxpayer revenue ruling requests or field requests for technical advice. Id
With respect to GCM's, the 'court found that the documents were "'adopted' as final
statements of agency policy and function[ed] as the 'working law' of the agency." Id. at
683.
"I Id at 671. Technical Memoranda (TM's) are prepared by the Legislation and
Regulations Division of the I.R.S. Office of Chief Counsel. TM's explain the reasoning
behind various decisions made in the drafting and promulgation of regulations adopted
as Treasury Decisions. Id With respect to TM's, the court found that the documents
had "been informally adopted by the agency as explanations of its policy, and are used
by personnel within the agency as the 'working law' of the agency." Id. at 683.
118 Id at 672. Action on Decision Memoranda (AOD's) are prepared by the Chief
Counsel's Tax Litigation Division, with the concurrence of the Assistant Commissioner
(Technical), and these memoranda underlie decisions to "acquiesce" in or to "non-
acquiesce" in decisions of the tax court or the lower federal courts. Id. at 672-73. With
respect to AOD's, the court found that the documents constituted "explanations of the
agency's 'final' legal position on an issue." Id at 684.
Id. at 681-82.
'"646 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id at 660.
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stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."162
Exemption (6) has limited application because most information
falling within its scope is already protected from disclosure by
exemption (3). The I.R.S., however, has invoked exemption (6)
to protect the privacy of taxpayers required to register with the
I.R.S. 163
Exemption (7)
Exemption (7) applies to "investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes,"16' but only to the extent that the
production of those records would result in certain injuries to
Government or private interests of a kind specifically identified
by the statute."'6 Civil, administrative, and criminal investiga-
162 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). See note 16 supra. The language of exemption (6) has re-
mained the same since the adoption of FOIA in 1966.
"' Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974). A commercial
seller of wine-making equipment brought FOIA action to compel the I.R.S. to release
the names and addresses of persons required to register with the I.R.S. for the purpose
of being permitted to produce wine for family use without payment of tax. The I.R.S.
resisted disclosure of these names by invoking exemption (6). Id. at 134. In its opinion
the court invoked a balancing test to "determine whether release of the names and ad-
dresses would constitute an invasion of personal privacy and, if so, balance the
seriousness of that invasion with the purpose asserted for release." Id at 136. Since
Wine Hobby (the commercial seller) failed to assert a public interest purpose for
disclosure, the court concluded that the disclosure of the names and addresses would be
a "clearly unwarranted invasion" of personal privacy; such an invasion of privacy is
prohibited by exemption (6) of FOIA. Id at 137.
164 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). See note 16 supra. See also Luzaich v. United States,
77-1 U.S.T.C. 19250 (D. Minn. 1977). Plaintiff, Mary Luzaich, discovered that an audit
of her 1974 income tax return was prompted by a letter written by a third party.
Luzaich initiated a FOIA action to compel disclosure of the letter so that she could
learn the identity of the letter writer and the nature of the tip. The I.R.S. refused to
disclose the letter based upon exemption (7) of FOIA. The court held that portions of
the letter identifying the letter writer and other third parties could not be disclosed, but
that much of the letter could be disclosed under FOIA after deletions of the exempt por-
tions by the court. Id.
165 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)-(F) (1976). Investigatory records are exempt from disclosure
to the extent that their production would:
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings,
(B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,
(D) disclose the identity of a confidential source ....
(E) disclose investigative techniques and proceedings, or
(F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
Id
In adopting the requirement of specific showings of harm. Congress intended to
disapprove certain restrictive decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit, which had
held that the exemption applied to any investigatory file, even if the investigation was
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tions are all covered by exemption (7).166 As a general proposi-
tion, courts have taken a liberal approach regarding what con-
stitutes an "investigation." For example, an investigation of an
I.R.S. agent in connection with his alleged misconduct in an
audit qualifies as an investigation within the meaning of exemp-
tion (7).161
Most of the litigation under this exemption focuses on in-
vestigative records that would interfere with enforcement pro-
ceedings if their production were required. The most important
question under the "interference" rule is whether investigatory
files can be disclosed under FOIA before they would be subject
to disclosure under otherwise applicable discovery rules. In
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,168 the Supreme Court held
that disclosure of witnesses' statements before they would have
been disclosable under the discovery rules constituted in-
closed, and the disclosure of the file would have had no tendency to disclose the Govern-
ment's investigative efforts. See Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban
Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (open and active civil rights files ex-
empted from disclosure as investigatory files); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974) (court could not determine whether the Govern-
ment would be harmed by disclosure of files); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d
24 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (report on adequacy of U.S. Army's investigation of My Lai incident
considered an "investigatory file"); Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489
F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974) (materials compiled by FBI
following President Kennedy's assassination fall under the "investigatory file" exemp-
tion).
' See, e.g., Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
834 (1976) (investigative statements obtained by NLRB are exempted from disclosure);
B & C Tire Co. v. I.R.S., 376 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (files compiled by I.R.S.
agent in connection with audit are considered investigative files).
167 See Albin v. I.R.S., 79-2 U.S.T.C. 1 9584 ID.D.C. 1979). The misconduct investiga-
tion of the agent was compiled in connection with the criminal investigation of the tax-
payer. As a result, the misconduct investigation qualified as an investigation since it
was conducted for law enforcement purposes. Id.
'- 437 U.S. 214 (1978). The NLRB filed an unfair labor practice complaint against
employer Robbins & Tire Rubber Company. The company responded by requesting
copies of all written statements made by witnesses who were to be called by the Board
at the unfair labor practice hearing. The NLRB denied this request based upon exemp-
tion (7)(A). Id. The Court reasoned that the prehearing disclosure of witnesses'
statements would initiate precisely the kind of interference that exemption (7)(A) was
designed to prevent. For example, the premature release of the statements would allow
the employer to coerce or intimidate the witnesses so that they would change their
testimony or refuse to testify. Id. at 239. Such a result would interfere with the NLRB's
enforcement proceedings and would constitute a direct violation of exemption (7)(A).
Id. at 242-43.
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terference with an enforcement proceeding.16 9 The Court's
holding was limited to NLRB enforcement proceedings, but
three justices stated in a concurring opinion that they believed
disclosure prior to the time required by otherwise applicable
discovery rules would constitute interference within the mean-
ing of exemption (7)(A) in any enforcement proceeding. 170 Lower
courts that have considered the question in connection with tax
cases have found that FOIA disclosure prior to the time man-
dated by discovery rules would constitute "interference with
enforcement proceedings" under exemption (7)(A). 17'1 There has
also been considerable litigation involving exemption (7)(D)
which bars investigatory records from disclosure when their
production would disclose the identity of I.R.S. informants. 72
In several cases, the courts have been sensitive to the Service's
claim for protection by refusing to disclose the identity of the
informant.'73
Exemptions (8) and (9)
Exemption (8) protects from disclosure those matters involv-
ing an agency's "regulation or supervision of financial institu-
tions. 1 74 Exemption (9) deals with "geological and geophysical
information" that must be protected from disclosure. 75 The
greater number of I.R.S. records fall within the purview of prior
exemptions, not within the purview of either exemption (8) or
(9). As a result, the I.R.S. rarely invokes these exemptions as
defenses in litigation. 76
169 Id at 241-42.
170 Id. at 243.
See Grabinski v. I.R.S., 79-2 U.S.T.C. 9681 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (taxpayer not entitled
to disclosure of documents because such disclosure would interfere with enforcement
proceedings); Kanter v. I.R.S., 433 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Il. 1977) (agency has burden of
proof of showing that disclosure of materials would interfere with a law enforcement
proceeding).
'71 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1976).
'7s See Pope v. United States, 79-2 U.S.T.C. 1 9641 (5th Cir. 1979) (unsolicited infor-
mation obtained from confidential informants barred from disclosure by exemption
(7)(D)); Gregg v. I.R.S., 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9274 (D.D.C. 1980); Luzaich v. United States,
77-1 U.S.T.C. 9250 (D. Minn. 1977) (identity of letter writer protected from disclosure
by exemption (7)(D)).
7, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1976).
.715 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9) (1976).
-16 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8)-(9) (1976).
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INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 6110
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Section 6110 was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1976.' 77 Congressional members were concerned that the
private ruling system had "developed into a body of secret law
known only to a few members of the tax profession.' ' 78 Such
secrecy surrounding the system permitted some taxpayers or
outside parties to exert undue or improper influence over the
tax system.'7 9 Section 6110 aims to abolish such secrecy by re-
quiring the disclosure of the private rulings issued by the I.R.S.
Such rulings are viewed as constituting an important part of
the "internal law" of the I.R.S.' °0 Before the enactment of sec-
tion 6110, the I.R.S. was reluctant to disclose private rulings
because they dealt with the confidential information of private
individuals. During this time, several court decisions compelled
the disclosure of private rulings under FOIA.' s' With section
6110, Congress balanced the strong public need for disclosure
against the individual need for privacy. Both needs were pro-
tected by special sets of disclosure requirements'"2 applicable
under section 6110.
The first set of disclosure requirements outlines procedures to
restrain disclosure.'"" Upon the issuance of any written deter-
mination or upon the receipt of a request for a background file
document, the Secretary must issue a "notice of intention to
disclose such determination.., to any person to whom the writ-
, Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1667 (1976).
"' S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 305-06 (1976).
179 Id.
I-- I.R.C. § 6110(a), (b)(l)-(2). The general rule requires that two categories of informa-
tion- "written determinations" and "background file documents"-be open to public
inspection. Id Section 6110 defines "written determination" to include "rulings,"
"determination letters," and "technical advice memoranda." Id. § 6110(b)(1). The terms
"ruling," "determination letters," and "technical advice memoranda" are defined by
regulation rather than by § 6110. See notes 196-98 infra. Section 6110 also distinguishes
between "reference written determinations," which are those the Secretary deems to
have significant reference value, and other determinations, which the statute defines as
"general written determinations." Id. § 6110(b)(3)(A)-(B).
181 See, e.g., Freuhauf Corp. v. I.R.S., 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in light of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 429 U.S. 1085
(1977); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. I.R.S., 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
"I I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3H4).
183 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3)(A)-(B).
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ten determination pertains.'" 84 Thereafter, the person who has a
direct interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the deter-
mination must protest the disclosure within twenty days. 86 If
the I.R.S. and the protesting party cannot agree on what is to
be disclosed, the protesting party may file a petition in Tax
Court for a determination of what must be disclosed.8 6 Such a
petition must be filed within sixty days after the mailing of the
notice of intention.87 Within.fifteen days of the petition's ser-
vice, the Secretary is required to notify all other persons to
whom the determination pertains to give them a right to in-
tervene in the proceeding.' "
Conversely, the second set- of disclosure requirements ad-
dresses procedures to compel disclosure. 89 Under these
guidelines any person may file a request for additional
disclosure with respect to a written determination. The request
must meet certain requirements.'" Upon receipt of such a re-
quest, the I.R.S. will notify the person to whom the determina-
tion pertains, and if this person protests the disclosure within
twenty days, then the I.R.S. will deny the information to the re-
,18 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(1). This portion of § 6110 was further defined in Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6110-2(h)(i), T.D. 7524, 1978-1 C.B. 416:
A "person to whom a written determination pertains" is the person by whom
a ruling or determination letter is requested, but if requested by an authoriz-
ed representative, the person on whose behalf the request is made. With
respect to a technical advice memorandum a "person to whom a written deter-
mination pertains" is the taxpayer whose return is being examined or whose
claim for refund or credit is being considered.
Id.
185 Treas. Reg. § 601.201(e)(16). This regulation should be read in conjunction with
Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-2(k), T.D. 7524, 1978-1 C.B. 416:
A "person who has a direct interest in maintaining the confidentiality of a
written determination" is any person whose name and address is listed in the
request for such written determination .... A "person who has a direct in-
terest in maintaining the confidentiality of a background file document" is
any person whose name and address is in such background file document, or
who has a direct interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the written
determination to which such background file document relates.
Id.
186 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3)(A).
187 Id.
" I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3)(B).
"' I.R.C. § 6110(f}(4)(A).
... Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-5(d)(1), T.D. 7524, 1978-1 C.B. 416. The request must state:
(1) the file number of the written determination or description of the background file
document; (2) the deleted information that the requester believes should be open to in-
spection; and (3) the basis for the request. Id.
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questing party. 9 ' Upon denial of his request, the requesting
party may file a petition in either the Tax Court or the District
of Columbia district court for an order requiring the
disclosure. 9 2 Again, the I.R.S. is required to give notice to the
interested parties, but it is not required to defend the disclosure
suit.' s9 In many respects the two sets of disclosure re-
quirements are mirror images of each other; the first set pro-
tects the individual's right to privacy and the second set pro-
tects the public's right to disclosure of I.R.S. documents. The
courts have held that these procedural requirements preempt
the generally applicable standards under FOIA.
94
B. SCOPE AND STRUCTURE
Section 6110 requires the disclosure of "written determina-
tions" and "background file documents.' '" s  "Rulings,'
"determination letters,' ' 7  and "technical advice
memorandum"'98 are all specific types of written determina-
tions. Each written determination has a corresponding
background file document that includes an individual's request
for that particular determination. 99 These are the only
documents that fall within the scope of section 6110.200 Written
191 Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-5(d)(1), T.D. 7524, 1978-1 C.B. 416.
192 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(4)(A)-(B).
Id. The burden of proof in a suit to compel disclosure is on a party opposing
disclosure, and the suit is tried de novo, even if there has been a prior suit to restrain
disclosure. Accordingly, even when there has been a prior successful suit to restrain
disclosure under § 6110(f)(3), a suit to that effect will not be the "law of the case" in a
subsequent suit to compel disclosure under § 6110(f)(4). Id § 6110(f)(4)(A).
"' See Grenier v. I.R.S., 449 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1978); Conway v. I.R.S., 447 F.
Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1978).
"' I.R.C. § 6110(b)(1)-(2).
I Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-2(d), T.D. 7524, 1978-1 C.B. 416. A ruling is defined as "a
written statement issued by the National Office to a taxpayer or to the taxpayer's
authorized representative.., that interprets and applies tax laws to a specific set of
facts." Id. It "generally recites the relevant facts, sets forth the applicable provisions
of law, and shows the application of the law to the facts." I&
"9 Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-2(e), T.D. 7524, 1978-1 C.B. 416. A determination letter is
defined as "a written statement issued by a district director in response to a written in-
quiry by an individual or an organization that applies principles and precedents
previously announced by the National Office to the particular facts involved." Id.
"I Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-2(f), T.D. 7524, 1978-1 C.B. 416. A technical advice
memorandum is defined as "a written statement issued by the National Office to, and
adopted by, a district director in connection with the examination of a taxpayer's
return or consideration of a taxpayer's claim for refund or credit." Id
1 I.R.C. § 6110(b)(2).
299 I.R.C. § 6110(b)(1)-(2).
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determinations are available for public inspection, ' but
background file documents are available only upon request.0 2
Also, a taxpayer must comply with certain procedures to obtain
information that is available only upon request.2 '
C. EXEMPTIONS
There are seven exemptions under section 6110 that closely
parallel the FOIA exemptions:
(1) the names, addresses, and other identifying details of the per-
sonts] to whom the written determination pertains... [must be
deleted]...
(2) information specifically authorized under criteria established by
an Executive order... [must be deleted]...
(3) information specifically exempted from disclosure by any
statute... applicable to the Internal Revenue Service... [must be
deleted]...
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information... [must be
deleted]...
(5) information the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy... [must be deleted]...
(6) information contained in... reports.., for use of an agency
responsible for... supervision of financial institutions... [must be
deleted]...
(7) geological and geophysical information... [must be
deleted] ... 204
Although there do not appear to be any reported decisions as
yet, it is likely that the court precedent under FOIA will be ap-
plied to the section 6110 exemptions as well.
THE PRIVACY AcT
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Privacy Act was enacted in 1974.205 The Act's legislative
history "establishes beyond doubt that the range of
discoverable material from a government agency under this
statute is narrower than that bestowed on individuals under the
Freedom of Information Act."20 The Act is not a general
disclosure statute; "[its] .primary purpose... is to allow
disclosure to an individual regarding information pertaining to
200 Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-1(a), T.D. 7524, 1978-1 C.B. 416.
2 Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-1(b), T.D. 7524, 1978-1 C.B. 416.
20' See generally Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-1(c)(4), T.D. 7524, 1978-1 C.B. 416.
20, I.R.C. § 6110(c)(l)-(7).
200 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896.
oelker v. I.R.S., 489 F. Supp. 40, 41 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
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him, while balancing the need to protect other individuals' right
to privacy.'"20
B. SCOPE AND STRUCTURE
The Privacy Act applies to "records "'0' that are maintained in
a "system of records" 20 by an agency under the Act. Every
agency maintaining a system of records is required to permit an
individual to review and copy his records upon request. 210 The
individual may bring a person of his own choosing to accom-
pany him during the review.211 In addition, any individual is per-
mitted to request an amendment of a record pertaining to him,
and the agency must make a determination of whether to per-
mit the amendment .21 If an agency refuses to amend, then it is
required to note the amendment request and to state its reasons
for refusing the request.13 If access to a record is denied, the in-
dividual may bring a civil action in the district where he resides,
where the records are located, or where he has his principal
place of business.2 1 4 The action may also be brought in the
District of Columbia.""' As with a FOIA suit, the district court
determines the matter de novo and has a right to inspect the
documents in camera.2" The court is permitted to assess
I See note 26 supra. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. NASA, 482 F. Supp.
281 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (daily time sheets were not considered a "record" within the mean-
ing of this section); Houston v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 494 F. Supp. 24
(D.D.C. 1979) (Privacy Act section only protects personal records so that an I.R.S.
agent's collection of information can be supplied to his supervisors without notice to
the agent).
1"5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (1976). See Savarese v. United States Dep't of HEW, 479 F.
Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1979), affd sub nom 620 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1078 (1981) (to invoke coverage under this section there must have been a retrieval
from the systems of records); Zeller v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(this Act applies to information that pertains to an individual and can be retrieved from
an agency's records system by some personal identifier of the individual).
110 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1976). See Doe v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 483 F.
Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Privacy Act held to apply to violation of recordkeeping stan-
dards even though records were made prior to effective date of Act).
5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1) (1976).
Id. § 552a(d)(2). See Zeller v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(plaintiff not entitled to injunction amending press release, where statements therein
were factually accurate and largely a matter of record).
" 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2)(b)(i)-(d)(4) (1976).
214 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (1976).
216 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(A) (1976).
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reasonable attorneys' fees against the United States in any case
in which a litigant has "substantially prevailed.
'21 7
C. EXEMPTIONS
In contrast to FOIA, the Privacy Act does not contain ex-
emptions which are operative of their own force; rather it
specifies categories of "systems of records" that the agencies
are permitted to make exempt by notice published in the
Federal Register.1 8 There are two "general exemptions 2 19 and
seven "specific exemptions. "220 Of these exemptions only the
"1 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(B) (1976).
21 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)-(k) (1976).
219 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1)-(2) (1976).
220 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1)-(7) (1976). The head of any agency may promulgate rules, in ac-
cordance with the requirements... of this title, to exenipt any system of records within
the agency ... if the system of records is:
(1) subject to the provisions of section 552(b)(1) of this title;
(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than
material within the scope of subsection (j)(2) of this section: Provided,
however, [tihat if any individual is denied any right, privilege, or benefit that
he would otherwise be entitled by Federal law ... such material shall be pro-
vided to such individual, except to the extent that the disclosure of such
material would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to
the Government... ;
(3) maintained in connection with providing protective services to the Presi-
dent of the United States or other individuals pursuant to section 3056 of title
18;
(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining
suitability, eligibility or qualifications for Federal civilian [or military]
employment.., but only to the extent that the disclosure of such material
would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the
Government... ;
(6) testing or examination material used solely to determine individual
qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service the
disclosure of which would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the
testing or examination process; or
(7) evaluation material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed
services, but only to the extent that the disclosure of such material would
reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the
Government ....
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(j)(2) general exemption 2 2 and the (k) specific exemption 222 are
important. The I.R.S. has identified 146 files as constituting
"systems of records" within the meaning of the Privacy Act. Of
these, some eighty have been exempted from Privacy Act provi-
sions under either subsection (j)(2) or (k)(2) of the Privacy Act. 2 3
CONCLUSION
As elaborated above, taxpayer access to information in the
hands of the I.R.S. is governed principally by three modern
statutes-the Freedom of Information Act, section 6110 of the
Internal Revenue Code, and the Privacy Act. The three statutes
are structurally similar, especially since each is composed of
provisions that define its scope by identifying the materials
which are subject to its disclosure requirements. Each statute
contains specific exemption provisions that limit the disclosure
mandated by each and provisions that govern procedural re-
quirements.
The Freedom of Information Act remains the most signifi-
cant source of authority for securing information from the
I.R.S. FOIA is still evolving and there are, as a result, unre-
solved questions concerning access to I.R.S. information under
its provisions. Foremost among these are questions concerning
the interaction of FOIA with section 6103 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which governs the disclosure of tax returns and
tax return information. Additionally, the scope of FOIA and the
other two statutes is subject to evolving interpretations. Such
interpretations determine an individual's access to classified
21 Id. § 552a(j)(2). This exemption pertains to systems of records "maintained by an
agency... which performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to the en-
forcement of criminal laws." There are three classes of information exempted under this
section:
(A) information compiled for the purpose of identifying individual criminal of-
fenders ... and consisting only of identifying data and notations of arrests,
the nature and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement,
release, and parole and probation status;
(B) information compiled for the purpose of a criminal investigation, including
reports of informants and investigators, and associated with an identifiable
individual; or
(C) reports identifiable to an individual compiled at any stage of the process of
enforcement of the criminal laws from arrest or indictment through release
from supervision.
Id.
222 Id § 552a(k)(2). See note 220 supra.
"' See 43 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1978).
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tax documents, internal tax memoranda and tax investigation
materials. The careful practitioner should be familiar with the
rules of each statute as to scope of application and as to the
various exemption provisions in order to design and evaluate
strategies for securing information from the I.R.S. that may be
valuable in his practice. 2
4
224 See generally Walter, Changes in Strategic Positions Between the IRS and Tax
Practitioners: Impact of the Disclosure of Information, 58 TAXES 815 (1980); 27 WAYNE
L. REV. 1315 (1981).
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